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INTRODUCTION
“It is gratifying . . . to see the Court now looking to and relying upon
legal history in determining the fundamental public character of the criminal
trial,” Justice Blackmun wrote in his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court ﬁrst recognized a First Amendment
public right of access.1 “The Court’s return to history is a welcome change in
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1 448 U.S. 555, 601 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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direction.”2 History is central to the Supreme Court’s recognition of a
constitutional right of access. The use of history in this context also raises
questions about why history should play a role in recognizing constitutional
rights and what types and durations of historical traditions should be required
to justify constitutional protection. These questions underlie circuit and
district courts’ application of Richmond Newspapers and its progeny.
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court held that a public right to attend criminal
trials is implicit in the First Amendment, based on the longstanding history of
public trials and the positive value of their openness.3 This seminal case, decided
in 1980, departed from three cases decided in the 1970s, in which the Court found
that journalists do not have a First Amendment right to enter prisons to
interview inmates.4 The Court subsequently extended its holding in Richmond
Newspapers to grant a right of access to criminal trials at which juvenile victims of
sexual assault testify,5 to voir dire proceedings6 and to preliminary hearings.7
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, the Court synthesized its prior
case law and articulated a two-part test to determine if the First Amendment
recognizes a right of access to a particular proceeding.8 First, courts are to
consider “whether the place and process have historically been open to the
press and general public.”9 Second, courts are to evaluate whether “public
Id.
Id. at 580.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 84950 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-35 (1974).
5 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982).
6 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I].
7 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise
II]. In addition to a First Amendment right of access, the Supreme Court has also recognized a
common law public right of access to inspect and copy judicial records and documents. See Nixon
v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“It is clear that the courts . . . recognize a
general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and
documents.”). This Comment does not address the common law right of access. The First
Amendment guarantee of access provides greater protection than the common law right because
there is a higher bar to overcome the First Amendment right then the common law one. To
overcome the First Amendment right, “it must be shown that the denial [of access] is
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.” Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-07. In contrast, a court may seal judicial
documents if competing interests outweigh the public’s common law right of access. Nixon, 435
U.S. at 598-99. Even though courts usually do not begin with constitutional claims,
“[s]ometimes constitutional adjudication is essential, as when a case comes to the Supreme
Court from a state court and only federal issues are open to consideration.” United States v.
Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010). One circuit judge also wrote that “[g]iven the
need for robust protection of a free press . . . , resolving the constitutional issues directly would
ordinarily be the appropriate and sensible course for district courts to take, notwithstanding the
general rule that we avoid such questions whenever possible.” United States v. Kaczynski, 154
F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
8 478 U.S. at 8.
9 Id.
2
3
4
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access plays a signiﬁcant positive role in the functioning of the particular
process in question.”10 If the particular proceeding “passes these tests of
experience and logic,” a qualiﬁed First Amendment right attaches.11 A court
must then evaluate if the countervailing interests favoring closure override
the First Amendment right of access.12
Lower courts have applied this test, dubbed the “experience and logic
test,” to evaluate rights of access to a variety of proceedings beyond criminal
trials and diﬀerent government documents.13 The test has been applied
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. In Globe Newspaper Co., the Court analyzed whether a qualiﬁed right of access can be
overridden in a diﬀerent manner. It held that only a compelling governmental interest pursued by
a means that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest can overcome a First Amendment right of
access. 457 U.S. at 607.
13 It is beyond the scope of this Comment, but circuit courts diverge on whether the
experience and logic test is a test of general applicability or whether it should exclusively be applied
in the criminal context. The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have consistently applied the test in
contexts other than criminal proceedings. For the Third Circuit, see PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705
F.3d 91, 104-07 (3d Cir. 2013) (summarizing Third Circuit case law on the application of the
experience and logic test, and recognizing that the Third Circuit has applied the test to find a right
of access to township meetings, deportation hearings, and administrative records). For the Sixth
Circuit, see, e.g., In re Search of Fair Finance, 692 F.3d 424, 429-30 (6th Cir. 2012) (arguing that
notwithstanding the fact that the experience and logic test initially was applied to criminal
proceedings, the test can be applied in a variety of other contexts, and citing circuit case law applying
the test to administrative hearings, deportation proceedings, and a variety of documents, including
voter lists and state agency reports); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 694-96, 700-05
(6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the experience and logic test is a test of general applicability and
applying it to recognize a right of access to deportation hearings). For the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g.,
Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 899-901 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court erred in not
applying the experience and logic test to determine whether a photographer had a right of access
to observe a wild horse gather roundup); Cal. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868,
875-77 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the experience and logic test to recognize a right of access to
executions); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying
the experience and logic test to recognize a right of access to voter lists). In some cases, courts in
the D.C., First, and Tenth Circuits have refused to apply the experience and logic test outside of
the criminal justice context. For the D.C. Circuit, see, e.g., Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087, 109293 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that the experience and logic test does not apply to access to habeas
corpus proceedings involving sensitive information); Ctr. for Nat. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (declining to apply the experience and logic test to a
challenge to disclosure of information compiled during a governmental investigation because
“[n]either the Supreme Court nor this Court ha[d] applied the Richmond Newspapers test outside
the context of criminal judicial proceedings or the transcripts of such proceedings”). For the First
Circuit, see El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 491, 495 (1st Cir. 1992) (declining to
apply the experience and logic test to a challenge to a district order denying enjoinment of the
Puerto Rico governor’s order restricting access to public documents because the court “seriously
question[ed] whether Richmond Newspapers and its progeny carry positive implications favoring
rights of access outside the criminal justice system”). For a court in the Tenth Circuit, see Okla.
Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1325 (D. Okla. 2014) (citing multiple Tenth Circuit cases
questioning the applicability of the experience and logic test to contexts beyond the individual
cases in which the Supreme Court applied it); see also Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, Could
10
11
12
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inconsistently by many courts, even when diﬀerent courts evaluated a right
of access to the same proceeding. As a result, diverging case law has emerged
on whether the First Amendment grants a right of access to deportation
hearings14 and executions,15 for example.
Scholarship on the application of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
right of access jurisprudence has addressed the topic from both broad and
narrow perspectives.16 Analyzing the issue holistically, some scholars have
criticized the experience and logic test and charted its inconsistent
application by lower courts.17 Some judges and academics maintain that the
test—and its use of history to justify a right of access—is not a sound
analytical framework in light of the evolving nature of judicial and
governmental proceedings18 and, in particular, the increasing movement of
some government aﬀairs from public court-like fora to private proceedings.19
The majority of scholars analyzing the First Amendment right of access have
taken a more narrow approach, focusing on whether a First Amendment right
of access should attach to a particular proceeding or assessing how diﬀerent
courts have addressed access to a speciﬁc proceeding or judicial document.20
But scholars have not analyzed the role of history in the Supreme Court
and lower courts’ First Amendment right of access doctrine in depth.
Professors Raleigh Hannah Levine and David Ardia both acknowledge that
Wild Horses Drag Access Away from Courtrooms? Expanding First Amendment Rights to New Pastures,
18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 247, 253-64 (2013) (analyzing the application of the experience and logic
test beyond the criminal justice context).
14 Compare N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting
a First Amendment right of access to deportation hearings), with Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700
(recognizing a First Amendment right of access to deportation hearings).
15 For cases recognizing a First Amendment right of access to view executions, see, e.g., Associated
Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2012); Cal. First Amendment Coalition, 299 F.3d at 875-77;
Guardian News & Media LLC v. Ryan, 225 F. Supp. 3d 859, 869 (D. Ariz. 2016); Phila. Inquirer v.
Wetzel, 906 F. Supp. 2d. 362, 370-71 (M.D. Pa. 2012). For cases rejecting a First Amendment right of
access to view executions, see, e.g., Okla. Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1324-28 (W.D. Okla.
2014); Ark. Times, Inc. v. Norris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3500 at *12 (E.D. Ark. 2008).
16 For recent scholarship on lower courts’ application of the experience and logic test, see, e.g.,
David Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835 (2017); Raleigh
Hannah Levine, Toward a New Public Access Doctrine, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2006); Kathleen
Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 461, 485-88 (2002).
17 See Ardia, supra note 16, at 840 (describing the experience and logic test as a “confusing and
inconsistent doctrinal roadmap for dealing with public access questions”); Levine, supra note 16,
1758-76 (detailing the diﬀerent ways lower courts have applied the experience and logic prongs, and
showing how whether a court conducts a broad or narrow historical inquiry aﬀects whether the
experience prong is met).
18 Kimba M. Wood, Re-Examining the Access Doctrine, COMM. LAW., Winter 1994, at 3, 4-5.
19 Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the
Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L. J. 1631, 1670-71 (2015).
20 Seven hundred and forty-three law review articles on Westlaw cite Press-Enterprise II, the
majority of which adopt this second approach.
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history is applied and used in different ways, and Levine argues that some of
the problems posed by the test are rooted in the Supreme Court’s development
of the doctrine.21 But they do not chart different taxonomies of uses of history
in the cases or analyze which approaches are in line with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. This focus deserves attention for two reasons. First, some
scholars have argued that the experience prong is the determinative factor.22
For example, in reviewing the lower courts’ application of the experience and
logic test, Levine claimed that no court has held that a proceeding that passed
the experience prong failed the logic prong.23 Second, using history as a basis
for constitutional rights raises interpretative questions. As Professor Jack
Balkin articulated, “Appeals to tradition are complicated by the fact that
consensus in practice and belief often disappears when we inspect history more
closely.”24 Balkin continued, “To argue from tradition or ethos, one must make
interpretive judgments about what aspects of American history are central and
. . . what aspects are peripheral . . . or have been . . . repudiated as time has
passed.”25 Using history as a basis for a constitutional right also raises questions
about “what kind of history counts, [and] how unequivocal the history must
be . . . .”26 These challenges are demonstrated by this area of law because close
examination of the case law reveals that lower courts have interpreted the
Supreme Court’s mandate to evaluate history to recognize a constitutional
right of access in different ways.
This Comment addresses this dearth in scholarship by identifying eight
ways lower courts use history to analyze the experience prong of the
experience and logic test. I identiﬁed these taxonomies by reviewing 185
federal circuit court opinions in Westlaw that cited Press-Enterprise II,
seventy-six of which applied the experience and logic test. I also reviewed
some federal district court and state court opinions cited in the circuit court
opinions and scholarly articles. I focus on the range of ways courts have
handled “mixed history”—a proceeding that is replete with examples of both
open and closed practices. This Comment analyzes to what degree these
diﬀerent taxonomies are in line with, or depart from, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the topic. Like Levine, I argue that some of the diﬀerent
approaches reﬂect uncertainty and unanswered questions in the Supreme
See Ardia, supra note 16, at 859-61; Levine, supra note 16, at 1742, 1756-77.
See Ardia, supra note 16, at 859 (“[F]or many courts, whether there has been a history of public
access to a particular court proceeding is determinative of whether a First Amendment right of access
exists.”); Wood, supra note 18, at 6 (“[T]he effect of the current emptiness of the function prong is to
make the history prong of the access test even more influential than it would otherwise be.”).
23 Levine, supra note 16, at 1777-78.
24 Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 678 (2013).
25 Id.
26 Curtis A. Bradley & Neil Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity and
Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21.
21
22
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Court’s opinions. This analysis demonstrates that lower courts have little
direction regarding how to conceptualize historical traditions that are beset
by open and closed practices, or proceedings that lack a historical tradition of
access because they are relatively new. Nevertheless, while this Comment
shows that a range of approaches to the experience prong are in line with the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, analyzing the diﬀerent uses of history by
lower courts in detail underscores scholars’ critiques of the doctrine. In
particular, it shows that the experience prong is not suited to address new
practices when there may be no history of openness or closure, and that the
emphasis on history does not allow the right of access doctrine to
accommodate changes in governmental practice and innovation.27
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes the Supreme Court’s
right of access jurisprudence. Part II surveys lower courts’ application of the
experience prong by identifying eight ways courts apply this part of the
experience and logic test. Part III articulates reasons for and against the use of
history as a basis for constitutional protection. Part IV analyzes the degree to
which the practices of lower courts are in line with or depart from the reasoning
of, and the historical constructions in, the Supreme Court jurisprudence. The
Comment concludes by assessing what the varied ways courts use history in
this context demonstrates about the foundations of this right.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S RIGHT OF ACCESS JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the First Amendment public right
of access includes two lines of cases: one recognizing a First Amendment public
right of access to observe criminal trials and other aspects of the criminal process
in court,28 and an earlier line of cases holding that members of the press do not
have a First Amendment public right of access to interview inmates in prison.29
27 It is beyond the scope of this Comment, but after charting diﬀerent taxonomies and
analyzing to what degree they reﬂect the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, further study is required
to compare lower courts’ application of history in this context to other aspects of First Amendment
jurisprudence, including the public forum doctrine, and other areas of constitutional law in which
courts appeal to tradition and history, such as substantive due process.
28 See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
29 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe
v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). It is beyond the scope of this Comment, but the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials interacts with an accused’s Sixth Amendment rights in
myriad ways. See generally MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA: RECONCILING FAIR
TRIALS AND A FREE PRESS (1997). For example, the Supreme Court has considered the public right
of access when evaluating a convicted person’s challenge to the closure of a courtroom. See Weaver
v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017) (“The public-trial right also protects some interests
that do not belong to the defendant. After all, the right to an open courtroom protects the rights of
the public at large, and the press, as well as the rights of the accused.”). Additionally, in Presley v.
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Less than a decade before recognizing a First Amendment public right of
access to criminal trials, the Supreme Court decided three cases rejecting
journalists’ First Amendment challenges to various prison regulations limiting
journalists’ abilities to interview inmates. In Pell v. Procunier, journalists and
inmates challenged a California law that prohibited members of the press from
conducting face-to-face interviews with prisoners who they requested to
interview.30 In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., journalists argued that the Federal
Bureau of Prison’s policy precluding journalists from interviewing prisoners
violated the First Amendment.31 Four years later, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., a
California prison denied journalists’ request to inspect and take pictures of a
jail facility after they reported on the suicide of a prisoner.32 The journalists
claimed that the prison’s refusal to provide a means for the public to be
informed about the conditions in the jail violated the First Amendment.33
Garnering a full majority of the Court in Pell and Saxbe and a splintered
Court in Houchins, the Supreme Court rejected the three claims on the same
basis.34 It cited prior precedent that “the First Amendment does not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally.”35 Because the public does not have access to
prisoners, “newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their
inmates beyond that aﬀorded the general public.”36 The Court claimed that
whether prisons should be open to the public is a question of policy best
decided by a legislative body.37 It did not give credence to journalists’
arguments that the need to inform the public about prison conditions and
shed light on abuse justiﬁed a right of access.38 These cases are important
Georgia, the Court held that an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to a public voir dire proceeding
because the First Amendment recognizes a public right of access to voir dire proceedings. 558 U.S.
209, 212-13 (2010). Additionally, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court articulated that the public
right of access to criminal proceedings is one of four access-to-courts rights that Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act enforces. 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004). The other rights are the right of
a criminal defendant to be present at all critical stages of the trial, the right of a litigant to have a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in judicial proceedings, and the right of a criminal defendant
to a trial by a jury composed of a fair crosssection of the community. Id. Conceptualizing the public
right of access as on par with these foundational rights of the accused underscores the importance
of, and deference to, the First Amendment right of access.
30 417 U.S. at 819.
31 417 U.S. at 844.
32 438 U.S. at 3.
33 Id. at 4.
34 In Houchins, Justices White and Rehnquist joined Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, Justice
Stewart filed an opinion concurring in the judgement, and Justice Stevens filed a dissent that Justices
Brennan and Powell joined. Justices Blackmun and Marshall did not participate in the case. Id. at 1.
35 Pell, 417 U.S. at 833 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972)).
36 Id. at 834.
37 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 12.
38 Id. at 8-9.
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background for the subsequent cases recognizing a First Amendment right of
access because they stand for the proposition that the press does not have a
greater right of access than the public.
In 1980, the Supreme Court next addressed whether the First
Amendment recognizes a right of access to criminal trials. Criminal trials are
a foil to prisons because criminal trials have historically been open to the
public. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, journalists challenged a judicial
order closing a murder trial to the press and to the public.39 In its plurality
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held for the ﬁrst time
that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment.”40 The Court acknowledged that “without the freedom to
attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important
aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’”41
The Court recognized this constitutional right based on the long history
of trials being open to the public and multiple positive benefits of the
practice. The Court sketched the history of open trials, noting that trials
were open to the public in England since before the Norman Conquest in
the eleventh century, and remained so through the fourteenth to sixteenth
centuries.42 Open trials were also an aspect of the judicial systems of
colonial America, and some colonies codified by law that trials must remain
open to the public.43 Chief Justice Burger’s opinion concluded its review of
the history of open trials with evidence from the First Continental
Congress in 1774, and described the historical tradition as “unbroken” and
“uncontradicted.”44 Based on its historical survey, the Court concluded,
“[T]he historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when
our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had
long been presumptively open.”45
The Court continued that the public quality of trials is “no quirk of
history” but “has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an
Anglo-American trial.”46 The plurality opinion offered multiple policy
justifications for the practice. It argued that open trials increase confidence in
the administration of justice because they assure the public that proceedings
are conducted fairly, discourage perjury, and provide the public with an
448 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1980).
Id. at 580. Justice Rehnquist was the sole justice to dissent in Richmond Newspapers. Justice
Rehnquist was unwilling to recognize an implied constitutional right of access and also raised federalism
concerns about a First Amendment right of access. Id. at 605-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 580 (majority opinion) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
42 Id. at 565-66.
43 Id. at 567-68.
44 Id. at 568, 573.
45 Id. at 569.
46 Id. at 569.
39
40
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opportunity to understand the criminal justice system.47 The Court also found
that open trials have “community therapeutic value” as open proceedings
provide an “outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion” after a
shocking crime and decrease the likelihood that people will resort to vigilante
measures in response to a tragic incident.48 The Court acknowledged that
these reasons are “as valid today as in centuries past.”49 Even though the First
Amendment does not expressly address a right of access, the plurality opinion
wrote that it is implicit in the First Amendment because the amendment
“assure[s] freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government.”50 The plurality opinion acknowledged that the First
Amendment “prohibit[s the] government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw.”51 Thus it held that
in the context of trials, “the First Amendment . . . prohibit[s the] government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the
public at the time that [the] Amendment was adopted.”52
Justice Brennan’s concurrence is an important complement to the plurality
opinion, and it was incorporated into the majority opinions of later Supreme
Court cases involving the First Amendment right of access. Justice Brennan
explained why history is an important consideration in recognizing a
constitutional right of access to criminal trials. Justice Brennan wrote that “the
case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and
vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information” because
“the Constitution caries the gloss of history” and because “a tradition of
accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience.”53 Justice Brennan’s
construction of the historical tradition of public trials was more expansive than
the one Chief Justice Burger provided. Justice Brennan extended his historical
inquiry beyond the framing of the Constitution and recognized that the majority
of states secure the right to public trials by statute and that the Supreme Court
has “persistently defended the public character of the trial process.”54
In addition to the justiﬁcations oﬀered for a right to attend trials in Chief
Justice Burger’s opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized the “structural value of
public access” to criminal trials.55 In particular, Justice Brennan recognized
the “structural role [the First Amendment] play[s] in securing and fostering
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 569-72.
Id. at 570-71.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
Id.
Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 598.
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our republican system of self-government” and the underlying assumption
that “public debate . . . must be informed.”56 The “structural model links the
First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a
democracy to survive,” Justice Brennan wrote.57 But Justice Brennan
recognized that the “structural value” of increased information can be applied
to “theoretically endless” situations, and thus maintained that “resolution of
First Amendment public access claims in individual cases must be strongly
inﬂuenced by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment of the
speciﬁc structural value of public access in the circumstances.”58 Thus Justice
Brennan conceived appeals to history and an assessment of the “speciﬁc
structural value of public access” as limiting the application of the First
Amendment right the Court recognized in Richmond Newspapers.
The principles outlined in Richmond Newspapers were applied two years
later in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. A Massachusetts statute, as
construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, required trial
judges to exclude the general public and the press from courtrooms when
victims of some sexual offenses who were under the age of eighteen
testified.59 After being denied access to a rape trial involving the rapes of a
seventeen-year-old and two sixteen-year-olds, the Globe Newspaper
Company argued that the statute violated the press’s First Amendment right
to attend a public trial.60 In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan that
garnered a five-vote majority, the Supreme Court held that the statute
violated the First Amendment because, citing Richmond Newspapers, criminal
trials have historically been open to the press and public, and because,
repeating many of the arguments for public access articulated in the plurality
opinion and in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, public
access to trials plays a “significant role in the functioning of the judicial
process and the government as a whole.”61
The Court’s opinion focused on the history of open trials broadly and did
not mention that historically trials have been closed while sexual assault
victims testiﬁed. This prompted Chief Justice Burger, who authored the
plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, to dissent in Globe Newspapers.62
Chief Justice Burger argued that the Court’s historical inquiry “ignores the
weight of historical practice” because “[t]here is clearly a long history of
exclusion of the public from trials involving sexual assaults, particularly those
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 587.
Id. at 587-88.
Id. at 588, 597-98.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
Id. at 598.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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against minors” and because “[s]everal states have longstanding provisions
allowing closure of cases involving sexual assaults against minors.”63 The
majority of the Court conducted a broad historical inquiry, but Chief Justice
Burger’s dissent argued for a more narrow construction.
Two years later, in Press-Enterprise I, the Court extended the First
Amendment right of access to voir dire proceedings with a unanimous
judgment.64 In a California murder trial, voir dire took six weeks, and all but
approximately three of the days were closed to the public.65 The petitioner
sought the transcript of the proceedings, which the judge denied.66 Like in
Richmond Newspapers, the Court charted the history of public jury
examinations in England and in colonial America, and ended its inquiry with
the trial of two British soldiers charged with murder after the Boston
Massacre.67 The Court claimed that the justiﬁcations for open trials oﬀered
in Richmond Newspapers apply to this part of the trial as well, and recognized
a First Amendment right to attend voir dire proceedings.68
In Press-Enterprise II, the Court recognized a qualiﬁed First Amendment
right of access to preliminary hearings in a criminal case.69 Synthesizing its
case law, the Court articulated a test to determine if a right of access attaches.
[O]ur decisions have emphasized two complementary considerations. First,
because a ‘tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
experience’ (citation omitted) we have considered whether the place and
process have historically been open to the press and general public . . . . Second,
in this setting the Court has traditionally considered whether public access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question . . . . These considerations of experience and logic are, of course,
related, for history and experience shape the functioning of governmental
processes.70

The Court also maintained that whether a First Amendment right of access
attaches does not revolve on the “label we give the event, i.e. ‘trial’ or otherwise.”71

63 Id. at 614. Chief Justice Burger also argued that the law was constitutional in light of the
weight of the state’s interest in protecting minor victims of rape. Id. at 615-16.
64 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984). Chief Justice Burger wrote
the Court’s opinion, and Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall wrote separate concurring
opinions, of which Justice Marshall’s concurred in the judgment.
65 Id. at 503.
66 Id. at 503-04.
67 Id. at 505-08.
68 Id. at 508-11.
69 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
70 Id. at 8-9
71 Id. at 7.

1572

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1561

The scope of the historical inquiry in this case differed from the three
prior Supreme Court opinions. Unlike the prior plurality and majority
opinions that surveyed English history and early eighteenth century
American history, the Court began its inquiry with the trial of Aaron Burr
in 1807, and concluded that from this trial “until the present day, the near
uniform practice of state and federal courts has been to conduct
preliminary hearings in open court.”72 The Court acknowledged that
several states allow preliminary hearings to be closed on the motion of the
accused, but claimed that the proceedings are still presumptively open to
the public and are only closed for cause.73 The Court claimed that the
justifications for public access to criminal trials cited in its prior cases are
applicable to preliminary hearings as well.74
Justice Stevens dissented in Press-Enterprise II because he reached the
opposite conclusion applying the experience and logic test. On the
experience prong, Justice Stevens argued that “[t]he historical evidence
proffered in this case is far less probative than the evidence adduced in
prior cases granting public access.”75 In particular, there was no commonlaw right of access to preliminary proceedings at the time of the adoption
of the First Amendment, and while in some states the proceedings have
been open to the public, in other states, including California and Michigan,
they have been closed.76 Thus, the majority and dissent articulated two
different approaches to interpreting historical phenomenon that involve
both open and closed practices. The majority is satisfied that the
continuous evidence of open preliminary hearings is sufficient to satisfy
the experience prong, even if at times preliminary hearings have been
closed and the practice was not rooted in common law. But Justice Stevens
cited specific states in which preliminary hearings were closed to
undermine the historical tradition of openness.
In 1993, the Supreme Court reﬁned the experience prong in El Vocero de
Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico by holding in a per curiam decision that a court
should not “look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead
to the ‘experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout the United
States.’”77 Besides this wrinkle, the Supreme Court has not revisited its First
Amendment right of access jurisprudence. The Court has not considered
what type of history is necessary or suﬃcient to satisfy the experience prong,

72
73
74
75
76
77

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 22-24.
508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993).
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or addressed whether a right of access extends to, and whether the experience
and logic test applies to, contexts outside of the criminal trial process.
II. LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE EXPERIENCE PRONG
Lower courts have applied the Supreme Court’s mandate to evaluate
history to determine if a First Amendment right of access attaches in
diﬀerent ways. Careful review of lower court case law reveals eight diﬀerent
modes of applying the experience prong, summarized in the table below.
Table 1: Lower Courts’ Eight Diﬀerent Applications
of the Experience Prong

Requiring History
1. Faithful to the Supreme Court’s
experience prong
2. Framing-era history
3. State statutes
4. Recent history and practices
5. Mixed history

Deemphasizing History
6. Rejecting historical analysis
altogether
7. Analogous historical inquiry
8. Not deciding the First
Amendment question because
closure was justiﬁed

1. Faithful to the Supreme Court’s Experience Prong
Some courts have been faithful to the Supreme Court’s construction of
the experience prong. In such situations, courts have either held that because
there is no historical tradition of access to a particular proceeding or
document, no constitutional right of access attaches, or courts have
recognized a right of access because they found a suﬃcient historical tradition
of openness. In some scenarios, courts have denied a right of access because
there was no history of openness including access to discovery in criminal
cases,78 to wiretap applications,79 to student disciplinary records,80 and to
presentencing reports.81 In various cases, journalists have sought access to
records from grand jury proceedings and search warrants; circuit courts have
repeatedly held that there is no First Amendment right of access to these
United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2013).
In re Application of the New York Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials,
557 F.3d 401, 410 (2d Cir. 2009).
80 United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 823 (6th Cir. 2002).
81 United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1989).
78
79
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records because the proceedings are historically and presumptively secret.82
Of the eight approaches outlined, this seems to be the most common.83
In some situations, courts have found that there is no longstanding
tradition of access, and accordingly denied a right of access, because the
proceedings, documents, or laws at issue were of recent creation. Three
examples illustrate this point.84 In 2013, the Fourth Circuit held that there is
no First Amendment right of access to a sealed order, issued pursuant to the
Stored Communications Act, that required social network providers to turn
over subscriber information to the government for an ongoing criminal
investigation.85 The court found that there was no long tradition of access to
orders required by the law because the law was only enacted in 1986.86
In addition, journalists in 1997 sought access to a plea agreement that
was submitted to a district court in Washington, D.C., so the court could
82 For cases denying right of access to grand jury-related proceedings, see, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 493 F.3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co.,
Inc. 142 F.3d 496, 502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1997);
In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records, 864 F.2d 1559, 1562
(11th Cir. 1989). For cases denying right of access to search warrant aﬃdavits and materials, see, e.g.,
In re Search of Fair Finance, 692 F.3d 424, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2012); In re Application of the New York
Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d at 410; Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz,
886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989); Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir.
1989). But see In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Oﬃce of Thomas Gunn, 855 F.2d
569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing a First Amendment right of access to search warrant
applications and receipts because they are routinely ﬁled with the clerk of the court without seal,
and because judicial records and documents have historically been open to public inspection).
83 For other cases adopting this approach, see In re Copay Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th
Cir. 2008) (denying right of access to a memorandum and documents supporting the government’s
motion to seal because there is “no historical experience of access to such documents, and logic
militates against granting such access”); United States v. Wolfson, 55 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that there is no history “of access on the part of the public to documents to which the
defendant himself has been denied”); Calder v. Internal Revenue Serv., 890 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir.
1989) (denying right of access to Al Capone’s IRS records because there is no history of access to
such documents); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1175 (3d Cir. 1986) (denying
right of access to administrative records of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources because plaintiﬀ has not alleged the existence of a historic tradition of access).
84 For other cases that hold that there is no historical tradition of access because the proceeding
at issue was relatively new, see In re Morning Song Bird Food Litigation, 831 F.3d 765, 768, 777 (6th
Cir. 2016) (denying right of access to objections attached to a presentence reports sought by class
members in a civil lawsuit because objections historically have not been publicly available, as before
1975, most courts did not even permit defendants to access their presentence report and disclosure
to defendants only became automatic in 1983); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co.,
854 F.2d 900, 903-04 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that there is no history of access to summary jury
trials because they have been in existence for less than ten years); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805
F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986) (denying right of access to discovery proceedings because “the pretrial
discovery process is a fairly recent invention,” although discovery rules were enacted in 1938).
85 In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(D),
707 F.3d 283, 291-92 (4th Cir. 2013).
86 Id. at 291.
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rule on the government’s motion to seal the agreement.87 The D.C. Circuit
requires the government to file a plea agreement and a motion to seal the
agreement with a district court and mandates the district court to enter
notice of the motion in the public docket.88 This procedure, established by
the court in Washington Post v. Robinson89 in 1991, was created to ensure “that
the press and public have a fair opportunity to assert their presumptive First
Amendment right of access to any agreement on which a plea is entered.”90
Nonetheless, assessing journalists’ right of access to the agreement, the
court found that “there can hardly be a historical tradition of access to the
documents accompanying a procedure that did not exist until Robinson
imposed it in 1991.”91 This example is instructive because it recognizes a
court’s awareness of a need to change its procedures to accommodate the
First Amendment right of access, but then does not provide a way for the
experience and logic test to account for the change in practice.
A year after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. El-Sayegh, the
Tenth Circuit was presented with the question whether a newspaper has a right
of access to sealed information about fees and costs filed under the Criminal
Justice Act by court appointed criminal defense attorneys.92 The court held that
there was no right of access to the material.93 Because the Criminal Justice Act
was only passed in 1964, the “CJA is too recent in origin to have developed any
‘history’ or ‘tradition’ with respect to press access to documents required by that
Act.”94 These three cases all found that there was no history of access because
the documents sought were related to laws or procedures of recent creation.
Some courts’ historical analyses resemble Richmond Newspapers’s treatment of
the experience prong. In Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, two newspapers
challenged the Connecticut state courts’ practice of sealing some docket sheets.95
The Second Circuit relied on history from England and the United States to
demonstrate that docket sheets historically were open to the public, including
state statutes passed in the early years of the United States that required clerks
to maintain open records of judicial proceedings in the form of docket books.96
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, journalists challenged a Massachusetts
statute that required records in criminal cases that did not result in

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Id.
935 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d at 159 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 161.
United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1254-55.
Id. at 1257.
380 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 94-95.
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convictions to be sealed.97 The court relied on the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and Congress’s use of pamphlets reproducing
proceedings of political prosecutions and centuries of treason, heresy, and
sedition trials in England housed in the Philadelphia Library to demonstrate
historical access and the “value placed on access to records of secretive
criminal proceedings.”98 The court used “historical materials available to the
framers of the Constitution” to rebut the appellee’s position that “our
historical tradition has not been one of presumptive openness.”99
In addition, when assessing constitutional claims of access to plea and
sentencing hearings, some courts have merely written that plea and sentencing
hearings are typically held in open court in order to satisfy the experience
prong.100 Notably, the cases in which courts appear most faithful to the
Supreme Court’s construction of the experience prong and find that this part
of the test is met involve access to different aspects of the judicial system.
2. Framing-Era History
Taking the most extreme approach, one court required Framing-era
history to satisfy the experience prong. The Tennessee Press Association
challenged the Tennessee General Assembly’s practice of closing legislative
meetings to the public.101 The court rejected the plaintiﬀ’s claim of a First
Amendment right of access to state legislative meetings because “the First
Amendment was not adopted against a backdrop of a long history of
legislative sessions being presumptively open.”102 The court required
97 868 F.2d 497, 499-500 (1st Cir. 1989).
98 Id. at 503.
99 Id.
100 For plea and sentencing hearings, see In

re Heart Newspapers, L.L.C., 641 F.3d 168, 177 (5th
Cir. 2011) (“Sentencing proceedings have historically been open to the press and public.”); Wash. Post
v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“In accord with the rulings of our sister Second, Fourth,
and Ninth Circuits, we now find that plea agreements have traditionally been open to the public.”);
Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e observe
that plea agreements have typically been open to the public. Nothing has been provided to suggest
historical practice is to the contrary.”); United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Plea
hearings have typically been open to the public, and such access, as in the case of criminal trials, . . .
serves to allow public scrutiny of the conduct of courts and prosecutors.”); In re Wash. Post Co., 807
F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[H]istorical and functional considerations weigh in favor of finding a
First Amendment right of access here. Sentencings have historically been open to the public; while
plea hearings do not have the same long tradition, they are typically held in open court.”). In addition,
this approach was adopted with respect to access to oral arguments in appellate proceedings. See United
States v. Moussaoui, 65 F. App’x 881, 890 (4th Cir. 2003) (arguing that appellate oral arguments “have
historically been open to the public, and the very considerations that counsel in favor of openness of
criminal trial support a similar degree of openness in appellate proceedings”).
101 Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
102 Id. at 777.
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Framing-era history to justify a right of access in spite of the fact that
Tennessee’s Sunshine Law, which required some branches of state
government to hold some meetings in public, was passed in 1974.103
3. State Statutes
Other courts found evidence that state statutes guarantee openness to a
particular proceeding suﬃcient to satisfy the experience prong. In Whiteland
Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, a township planning commission
banned the videotaping of a meeting, and a building company ﬁled a lawsuit
against the township arguing that the policy violated the First Amendment.104
The Third Circuit recognized that the company had a constitutional right of
access to the planning commission meeting, although it held that the right
did not extend to videotaping the meeting.105 The court maintained that the
experience prong was satisﬁed because public access to such meetings is
guaranteed by two Pennsylvania statutes: the Sunshine Act of 1986 and the
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code of 1968.106
In Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture did not provide an almond processor and distributor a list of
California almond growers eligible to vote in a referendum that it requested
via a freedom of information request.107 The Ninth Circuit recognized a First
Amendment right of access to voter lists.108 It held that “it seems likely that a
tradition of public access to voter lists exists” both because several state
statutes expressly provide for access, including Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, and because none bar public access.109
Thus, these cases relied on access guaranteed by laws, many of which were
passed in the last half of the twentieth century, to satisfy the experience prong.
4. Recent History and Practices
Some courts have relied on recent histories and practices to satisfy the
experience prong. Three cases illustrate this approach.110 In August 2011, Erie
Id.
193 F.3d 177, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 184.
Id. at 181.
960 F.2d 105, 106 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 109.
Id.
For other cases adopting this approach, see N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 301 n.11 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Transit Authority Bureau hearings are
presumptively open to the public in part because for the two decades that the hearings were only
held in criminal court, and were not also held in a separate administrative proceeding, they were
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
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County, New York, entered into a settlement agreement with the Department
of Justice following an investigation into violations of prisoners’ constitutional
rights at prisons in the county.111 As part of the settlement, the parties agreed
that a monitor would file compliance reports, and the district court permitted
the reports to be filed under seal.112 The New York Civil Liberties Union
intervened for the reports to be unsealed.113 Reversing the district court’s
determination that a First Amendment right of access did not attach to the
reports, the Second Circuit relied on the fact that monitor reports in four
recent, similar cases were public to demonstrate a tradition of openness.114
In Applications of National Broadcasting Co., a television station sought to
obtain sealed documents relating to a motion to disqualify a judge, and the
district court held that the television station did not satisfy the experience
and logic test.115 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, and
found a qualiﬁed right of access to the information sought.116 The Sixth
Circuit held that there is “clearly a tradition of accessibility to disqualiﬁcation
proceedings” because, reviewing Sixth Circuit cases involving the
disqualiﬁcation of judges from 1924 to 1984, it found no cases in which the
proceedings were closed or the records were sealed.117 The court found that
the absence of a closed proceeding in the Sixth Circuit during a sixty-year
period was enough to satisfy the experience prong.
In addition, in July 1981, the White House excluded television media
representatives from the press pool, and various news stations claimed that
this action violated their First Amendment right of access.118 The district
court held that the experience prong of the test was satisﬁed because there is
a “history of pool coverage of presidential activities going back through
several past Administrations in which television news representatives took
open to the public); United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that
“historically, sentences have been imposed in open court” as demonstrated by “[n]umerous cases
from over a century ago describ[ing] sentencing proceedings held in open court”); Leigh v. Salazar,
954 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100-01 (D. Nev. 2013) (holding that wild horse gathers have historically been
open to the public based on the Bureau of Labor Management’s policy directive of holding guided
public observation days and testimony from a journalist that for twelve years she has attended public
wild horse gathers on public land). The district court in Leigh v. Salazar applied the experience and
logic test after the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s initial ruling because
the district court had not applied the experience and logic test to determine whether a photographer
had a right of access to observe a wild horse gather roundup. Id. at 899.
111 United States v. Erie Cty., N.Y., 763 F.3d 235, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2014).
112 Id. at 237-38.
113 Id. at 238.
114 Id. at 241-42.
115 828 F.2d 340, 341-42 (6th Cir. 1987).
116 Id. at 345.
117 Id. at 344.
118 See, e.g., Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1239-40 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
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part.”119 In these cases, courts surveyed practices, and as long as they found a
continuous practice of openness—even a recent one or one of relatively short
duration—courts have held that the experience prong was satisﬁed. None of
these cases acknowledge that the tradition of access they presented is
narrower and more limited than those in the Supreme Court cases.
5. Mixed History
Courts have approached cases of “mixed history”—proceedings that are
replete with evidence of open and closed practices—differently. Some courts
have held that the experience prong is satisfied if the proceeding at issue has
been predominantly open, even if there are instances in which it was closed, or
if there are elements of openness in spite of other aspects indicating that the
procedure is closed to the public. Other courts, in contrast, have cited examples
in which the proceeding was closed to the public to demonstrate that the
experience prong was not met, even if there was ample evidence of public access.
a. Mixed History Is Suﬃcient
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit relied on the general
presumption and practice of open deportation hearings to satisfy the
experience prong and did not give weight to the instances of closed
deportation hearings the government cited to argue against a historical
tradition of openness.120 On September 21, 2001, the chief immigration
judge issued a directive to all federal immigration judges to close certain
cases to the press and public, including deportation hearings.121 In 2002, the
family of a man who was subject to deportation and members of the press
and public, including Congressman John Conyers, were denied access to a
deportation hearing.122 Journalists and Congressman Conyers filed
complaints under the First Amendment and other constitutional and
statutory provisions seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.123 The Sixth
Circuit held that a First Amendment right of access attaches to deportation
hearings.124 Analyzing the history of access to deportation hearings, the
court found that, although at times deportation hearings may have been
closed to the public, deportation hearings have generally been open.125 The
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id. at 1244.
303 F.3d 681, 700-03 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 684.
Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 701.
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court noted that although Congress has repeatedly passed statutes closing
exclusion hearings, no statute has ever required deportation hearings to be
closed.126 Furthermore, since 1965, regulations promulgated by the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service have explicitly required
deportation proceedings to be presumptively open.127
How to construe mixed history also affects whether there is a First
Amendment right of access to view executions. In 1996, California’s San
Quentin prison instituted a policy whereby witnesses could not observe an
inmate entering into an execution chamber and a prison employee strapping
the inmate to the gurney and administering intravenous lines.128 Witnesses
could only begin watching an execution after the inmate was sedated and
lay motionless on the gurney before lethal drugs were administered.129 A
coalition of journalists sued to enjoin the practice, and the Ninth Circuit
held that the public has a First Amendment right to view the entirety of
executions.130 Analyzing the experience prong, the court noted that
historically executions in England and in the United States were held in
public places and open to the public.131 When executions were moved from
public locations into prisons, states instituted practices to allow executions
to remain open to some public observation.132 California, for example,
passed a law that a minimum of twelve people should be present at a private
execution, and every state authorizing the death penalty requires official
witnesses to observe each execution.133 Most states also allow journalists to
attend executions.134 Given this history, the court held that even though
executions are now held in prisons where the public does not have right of
access, a First Amendment right of access to view executions extends from
the time the inmate is escorted into the chamber.135 The Ninth Circuit
articulated that while some features of executions—such as that they are
conducted in prisons—suggest that they are private, other elements—such
as allowing a few members of the public to view the events—are enough to
satisfy the experience prong.
Id.
Id.
Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 876.
Id. The holding and reasoning of California First Amendment Coalition was applied in another
Ninth Circuit case, Associated Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2012), and in district court
cases in Arizona, Guardian News & Media LLC v. Ryan, 225 F. Supp. 3d 859, 868-69 (D. Ariz. 2016),
and in Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Inquirer v. Wetzel, 906 F. Supp. 2d 362, 370 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
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b. Mixed History Is Not Suﬃcient
Other courts have reviewed the same proceedings and history and have
reached opposite conclusions regarding the experience prong. When
presented with the identical issue as the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press, the
Third Circuit held that deportation hearings did not pass the experience
prong because “the tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and
inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access.”136 The court
recognized that statutes and regulations create a presumption that
deportation hearings are accessible to the public.137 But despite this
presumption of openness, the court noted that deportation hearings are
sometimes conducted in places where there is no general right of access, such
as prisons, hospitals, or private homes.138 In addition, deportation hearings
involving abused alien children are closed by regulation, irrespective of where
they are held, and deportation hearings of abused alien spouses are closed
presumptively.139 The court refuted the signiﬁcance of Department of Justice
regulations that created a presumption of openness by claiming that
“regulatory presumption is hardly the stuﬀ of which Constitutional rights are
forged.”140 The Third Circuit in great detail distinguished the historical
tradition of access to deportation hearings to the history of access to criminal
trials in Richmond Newspapers to explain why it declined to hold that
deportation hearings satisﬁed the experience prong.
We ultimately do not believe that deportation hearings boast a tradition
of openness suﬃcient to satisfy Richmond Newspapers. In Richmond
Newspapers itself, the Court noted an “unbroken, uncontradicted history” of
public access to criminal trials in Anglo American law running from “before
the Norman Conquest” to the present, and it emphasized that it had not
found “a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal,
state, or municipal court during the history of this country . . .”

136 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2002). This case prompted
a strong dissent from Judge Scirica, who believed that the experience and logic test was satisﬁed. Id.
at 222 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Judge Scirica wrote that the experience prong was met because
“[d]eportation hearings have a consistent history of openness.” Id. When Congress ﬁrst adopted
immigrant statutes at the end of the nineteenth century, Congress expressly closed exclusion
proceedings and left deportation hearings presumptively open. Id. Department of Justice
regulations, promulgated in 1964, mandate that all hearings other than exclusion hearings shall be
open to the public, subject to a few exceptions. Id.
137 Id. at 211-12 (majority opinion).
138 Id. at 212.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 213.
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The tradition of open deportation hearings is simply not comparable. While
the expressio unius distinction between exclusion and deportation proceedings is
a tempting road to travel, we are unwilling effectively to craft a constitutional
right from mere Congressional silence, especially when faced with evidence that
some deportation proceedings were, and are, explicitly closed to the public or
conducted in places unlikely to allow general public access.141

Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit emphasized instances in which
deportation hearings are closed, and minimized the statutory and regulatory
presumptions of openness, to hold that the experience prong was not met.
Just as the Third Circuit approached the mixed history of deportation
hearings differently than the Sixth Circuit, district courts in Oklahoma and
Arkansas reached a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Ninth Circuit
in California First Amendment Coalition.142 An Oklahoma district court claimed
that the fact that executions in Oklahoma are conducted in private and that in
1890, the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute that required executions
to be conducted before sunrise, in a jail, or in a private enclosed area out of
public view, with a limited number of people present, demonstrated that the
history of public viewings of executions “is not the same ‘unbroken,
uncontradicted history’ of access that the Supreme Court found persuasive in
Richmond and its progeny.”143 Similarly, the Arkansas district court claimed
that unlike “the unbroken, uncontradicted history of public access to criminal
trials,” executions in the United States became private events in the early 1800s
when they were moved from the public square and into prisons.144 Since 1887,
Arkansas law dictated that executions in the state are private, and the court
held that the fact that six to twelve people may watch an execution does not
“transform a private execution into a public proceeding.”145 In these cases,
courts held that the limited public access to executions does not mitigate the
private elements of executions codified in statutes.146
Id. at 212-13.
See Okla. Observer v. Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1325 (D. Okla. 2014).
Id.
Ark. Times, Inc. v. Norris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3500, at *12 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008).
Id. at *13.
The question about how to construe mixed history also affects whether there is a First
Amendment right of access to information about lethal injections. In Georgia, an inmate on death row
challenged the constitutionality of Georgia’s execution-participant confidentiality statute, which classifies
information about people and entities that participate in executions as “confidential state secret[s].”
Owens v. Hill, 295 Ga. 302, 303 (2014). The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the inmate had did not
have a First Amendment right to receive information about his execution. Id. at 316-17. Applying the
experience and logic test, the court held that although there has been a tradition of allowing some public
access to execution proceedings, the fact that there is a longstanding tradition of concealing the identities
of people who carry out executions is enough to fail the experience prong. Id. The Ninth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion in Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014). The Ninth
141
142
143
144
145
146
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PG Publishing Co. v. Alchele, a Third Circuit case involving access to
polling sites, also involved mixed history, although in this case, the court
addressed the history of a proceeding that initially was public and did not
retain public elements when it became private over time.147 A trade group
representing media outlets in Pennsylvania challenged a Pennsylvania statute,
passed in 1937, that required all people, except voters, election oﬃcials, and
police oﬃcers, to remain at least ten feet away from a polling place during
voting.148 The group claimed that the law infringed their First Amendment
right to access and gather news at polling places.149 Assessing the history of
public access to polling sites, the court noted that in the colonial period,
voting was conducted by voice vote, a process that was freely accessible to the
public.150 Newly formed states then used paper ballots, and voters crafted
ballots at home and cast them at polling sites.151 In the late 1800s, states
abandoned this method and adopted the Australian system of voting, in which
candidates’ names were placed on a single ballot and citizens cast their votes
in polling booths.152 By 1896, about ninety percent of states had adopted the
Australian method.153 Accordingly, the court concluded that “[w]hile the act
of voting—and the process by which voting was carried out—began its life as
a public aﬀair, our Nation’s history demonstrates a decided and long-standing
trend away from openness, toward a closed electoral process.”154 As such, the
court held that the “historical record is insuﬃcient to establish a presumption
of openness in the context of the voting process.”155 Reviewing these cases
Circuit held that the fact that executions historically have been open to the public and that some states
have provided the public with information about lethal injection drug protocols is sufficient to satisfy
the experience prong at the preliminary injunction stage. Id. at 1083-84.
147 705 F.3d 91, 108-10 (3d Cir. 2013).
148 Id. at 95.
149 Id. at 95, 98.
150 Id. at 109.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 110.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. In 2004, the Sixth Circuit also addressed whether denying access to polling sites in
accordance with an Ohio statute violates the First Amendment. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co., Inc. v.
Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683, 684 (6th Cir. 2004) The Sixth Circuit held that the First Amendment was
violated and ordered journalists “to have reasonable access to any polling place for the purpose of newsgathering and reporting so long as [they] do not interfere with poll workers and voters.” Id. at 685.
Unlike the Third Circuit PG Publishing Co., the Sixth Circuit analyzed this question under the public
forum doctrine. Id. Under the public forum doctrine, for a state to “enforce a content-based exclusion”
“in places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,”
the state “must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
45-46 (1983). The Third Circuit strongly criticized the Sixth Circuit’s application of the public forum
doctrine. PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.2d at 113. First, the Third Circuit maintained that, under Supreme Court
and Third Circuit precedents, polling places are not public forum. Id. As such, it maintained that
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demonstrates two diﬀerent ways courts construe historical traditions that
include public and private elements when applying the experience prong.
6. Rejecting Historical Analysis Altogether
In cases in which there is a paucity of history, some courts have
sidestepped the experience prong altogether and have exclusively analyzed
whether the logic prong justiﬁed a First Amendment right of access. Three
federal criminal cases illustrate this approach.156
In United States v. Suarez, a Connecticut newspaper petitioned a district
court to intervene in an armed robbery case to request access to sealed records
of payments the defendants made under the Criminal Justice Act.157 The
district court granted the newspapers’ motion, and the defendants
appealed.158 The Second Circuit acknowledged that there is no long tradition
of accessibility to forms required by the Criminal Justice Act because the
statute, enacted in 1964, is a fairly recent development.159 Nonetheless, it
relied on the strength of the logic prong to recognize a First Amendment
right of access to the documents. “The lack of ‘tradition’ with respect to the
[Criminal Justice Act] forms does not detract from the public’s strong interest
in how its funds are being spent in the administration of criminal justice,” the
court found.160 Accordingly, it recognized a First Amendment right of access
to the documents sought “[b]ecause there is no persuasive reason to ignore

“adopting a traditional forum analysis for cases such as the one at bar sets a dangerous precedent which
permits the government too much freedom to hide their activities from the public’s view” because the
government would only have to satisfy a reasonableness standard for a ban on access to be upheld. Id.
But the Third Circuit maintained that the public forum doctrine is not appropriate to decide this issue
because the doctrine involves the regulation of expressions that take place on or seek access to public
property, while the access to polling sites at issue in the case involves access to “a government
proceeding for news-gathering purposes.” Id. The right of access doctrine does not involve the
regulation of expressions—it involves the right to be present, to observe and to obtain information.
156 For other cases that have adopted this approach, see, e.g., United States v. DeJournett, 817
F.3d 479, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2016) (recognizing a constitutional right of access to plea agreements
because “plea agreements play a central role in our criminal justice system” and access “plays a
signiﬁcant role in monitoring the administration of justice by plea” and not addressing the
experience prong); In re Copay Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that
there is no history of access to a hearing on a motion to seal because the proceeding is relatively
new, as it was created by the Ninth Circuit twenty-ﬁve years prior, but holding that a First
Amendment right of access attaches to the transcript of the hearing nonetheless because the hearings
were created “to give the public an opportunity to be heard,” and recognizing a right of access to a
plea colloquy transcript on the basis of the logic prong alone).
157 880 F.2d 626, 627-28 (2d Cir. 1989).
158 Id. at 628.
159 Id. at 631.
160 Id.
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the presumption of openness that applies to documents submitted in
connection with a criminal proceeding.161
The Second Circuit’s rejection of the experience prong in this case is of
particular interest because, as previously discussed, the Tenth Circuit relied
on the relative recent passage of the Criminal Justice Act to ﬁnd that there
was no history of access to documents ﬁled under the act and to reject a First
Amendment right of access in United States v. Gonzales.162
Similarly, in United States v. Simone, the Third Circuit recognized a First
Amendment right of access to post-trial examinations of a jury, even though
the court acknowledged that there is no “rich historical tradition” of access to
post-trial examinations of jury misconduct.163 In constructing the history of
access to post-trial examinations of jury misconduct, the plaintiﬀ only cited
three Florida state court cases from after 1980.164 Accordingly, the court held
that the experience prong is not instructive in this case, and relied solely on
the logic prong to recognize the right, partly because of the “overwhelming
historical support for access in other phases of the criminal process . . . .”165
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit was presented with the question of whether the
public has a First Amendment right of access to bail reduction hearings after
journalists challenged an order of a magistrate judge closing a bail reduction
hearing of a man indicted for killing a federal judge in 1979.166 The court
acknowledged that there is no “unbroken, uncontradicted history” of public
bond hearings because they are not always conducted in open court, and bond
amounts may be fixed at the police station, during telephone conversations or in
chambers.167 But the court held that “[b]ecause the [F]irst [A]mendment must
be interpreted in the context of current values and conditions, the lack of an
historic tradition of open bail reduction hearings does not bar our recognizing a
right of access to such hearings.”168 Instead, the court claimed that the
justifications for the First Amendment right of access articulated in the
Supreme Court cases are implicated in bail processes, which compelled the court
to recognize a First Amendment right of access.169 Thus, some lower courts
recognize that the experience prong is not instructive when evaluating access to
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 91–93.
14 F.3d 833, 837 (3d Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 838.
United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 355-57, 360 (1983); see also Seattle Times Co. v. U.S.
Dist. Court for the W. Dist. Of Wash., 845 F.2d 1513, 1516-17 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the lack
of a history of open pretrial detention bail proceedings should not automatically foreclose a right of
access and recognizing a right of access because of the importance of bail proceedings).
167 Chagra, 701 F.2d at 362-63.
168 Id. at 363 (internal citations omitted).
169 Id.
161
162
163
164
165
166
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proceedings that lack a historical tradition of openness, and in turn have entirely
relied on the logic prong when applying the experience and logic test.
7. Analogous Historical Inquiry
Some courts have compared relatively recent proceedings, which are too
new to have historical traditions of access, to older proceedings with such
histories to satisfy the experience prong. Three cases illustrate this approach.170
When a police officer in New York City issues a citation for a violation of transit
bureau rules, he issues a summons, either to criminal court or to an
administrative proceeding in which the person may contest the citation in an
in-person hearing.171 The proceedings in criminal court are open to the public,
but the person contesting the violation may exclude an individual from the
administrative proceeding.172 In 2012, the New York Civil Liberties Union filed
a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the policy violated the First
Amendment right of access to government proceedings, and the district court
granted an order enjoining the policy, which the transit authority appealed.173
Analyzing the history of access to the particular administrative proceeding, the
Second Circuit maintained that the proceeding is analogous to a criminal trial
because the Transit Authority Bureau “acts as an adjudicatory body, operates
under procedures modeled on those of the courts,” and because the two
proceedings are “functionally comparable” as either the Criminal Court or the
Transit Authority Bureau has jurisdiction.174 The Second Circuit elaborated
why it is appropriate to analogize to other proceedings.

170 For other cases adopting this approach, see In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d 198, 199 (6th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the experience prong was not met because a summary jury trial proceeding
is “essentially a settlement proceeding,” which is historically closed, because a summary jury trial
“does not present any matter for adjudication by the court, but functions to facilitate settlement”);
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2009) (comparing the history
of access to habeas proceedings to civil proceedings because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
a form of civil litigation, and concluding that because “there has been a history of public access to
civil proceedings . . . access to habeas proceedings has been historically available,” even though there
is virtually no case law on whether habeas proceedings have historically been open to the public);
Soc’y of Prof ’l Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D. Utah 1985) (acknowledging
that there is little historical tradition of public access to administrative fact-ﬁnding hearings, in part
because they are of recent origin, but holding that the experience prong was satisﬁed nonetheless
because congressional sessions have been open to the public “since the early history of our country”
and because civil trials, which are “analogous to administrative fact-ﬁnding proceedings,” have
historically been accessible to the public).
171 N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 2011).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 300-01.

2019]

The Logic of Experience

1587

[W]idespread administrative adjudication is a relatively new phenomenon. But
changes in the organization of government do not exempt new institutions from
the purview of old rules. Rather, they lead us to ask how the new institutions fit
into existing legal structures. If, as the NYCTA suggests, government
institutions that did not exist at the time of the Framers were insulated from the
principles of accountability and public participation that the Framers inscribed
in the First Amendment, legislatures could easily avoid constitutional strictures
by moving an old governmental function to a new institutional location.
Immunizing government proceedings from public scrutiny by placing them in
institutions the Framers could not have imagined, as the NYCTA urges, would
make avoidance of constitutional protections all too easy.175

The court recognized that it would be problematic if new proceedings
were immunized from constitutional scrutiny solely because they are new.
But given the right of access doctrine’s emphasis on history, the court found
a way for the “new institution” of administrative proceedings contesting
traﬃc violations to “ﬁt into existing legal structures” by comparing
administrative proceedings to criminal trials.176
In Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine, the Third Circuit
adopted a “broad historical approach” and evaluated the history of access to
both arbitration proceedings and civil trials.177 The case revolved around public
access to the Delaware Court of Chancery’s arbitration program, which serves
as an alternative to trial for some disputes.178 According to the statutes and rules
governing the proceedings, arbitration petitions are confidential and are not
included in the court’s public docketing system, only parties to the arbitration
and their representatives may attend, and all materials produced during the
arbitration are protected from disclosure.179 A watchdog group argued that the
confidentiality of the program violated the First Amendment.180 In evaluating
the watchdog group’s claim, the Third Circuit separately analyzed the history
of access to arbitration proceedings and to civil trials. It noted that civil trials
are generally open to the public, while arbitration proceedings have a “mixed
record of openness” because modern arbitrations are generally private, although
in some jurisdictions alternative dispute resolution proceedings supplement
civil litigation and are public.181 Nonetheless, the court held that “[t]aking the
private nature of many arbitrations into account, the history of civil trials and
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id. at 299 (citation omitted).
Id.
733 F.3d 510, 515-18 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 516-18.
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arbitrations demonstrates a strong tradition of openness for . . . Delaware’s
government-sponsored arbitrations” because of similarities between civil
litigation and the Delaware program.182 In particular, the court justified the
analogy because of the similarities between the two proceedings—including
that active judges preside over arbitration proceedings in a courthouse, and that
the arbitrations “result in a binding order of the Chancery Court, and . . . allow
only a limited right of appeal.”183 Even though the Third Circuit analyzed the
histories of arbitration proceedings and civil trials, its conclusion that the
experience prong was met rested largely on the similarities between the
Delaware arbitration program and civil proceedings.
Analogous reasoning also was a basis for the Sixth Circuit’s determination
in Detroit Free Press that the experience prong was satisﬁed, although it was
less central to the court’s conclusion than in the other cases discussed.184 In
addition to focusing on the history of deportation hearings, the court
compared deportation hearings to the sentencing phase of a trial.185
Deportation hearings, the court noted, “‘walk, talk, and squawk,’ very much
like a judicial proceeding.”186 The court held that the long-standing history of
openness to trials is instructive because “the only other federal court that can
enter an order of removal is a United States District Court during sentencing
in a criminal trial.”187 Thus, in some cases, analogous reasoning forms the
primary basis for courts’ determination on the experience prong, while in
other cases, the use of analogies complements courts’ consideration of the
history of access to particular proceedings.
8. Not Deciding the First Amendment Question Because Closure Was Justified
Lastly, some courts have not decided whether a First Amendment right
of access attaches to a particular proceeding. Instead they have resolved the
questions presented by claiming that a supposed right of access would not
survive strict scrutiny. Two cases illustrate this approach.188 In American Civil
Liberties Union v. Holder, the American Civil Liberties Union and other
watchdog groups challenged the False Claims Act’s requirement that qui tam
Id. at 518.
Id.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 702 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
For another case that adopts this approach, see United States v. Brice, 649 F.3d 793, 796
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to decide whether there is a First Amendment right of access to material
witness proceedings because a supposed right would be overcome because in the case at issue closure
served a compelling interest, there was a substantial probability that the compelling interest would
be harmed in the absence of closure, and there were no alternatives to closure).
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
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complaints must be ﬁled under seal and remain sealed for sixty days.189 The
appellants argued that the seal provision violated the public’s First
Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings and also raised a First
Amendment prior restraint challenge.190 The Fourth Circuit declined to
address whether the First Amendment right of access extends to qui tam
complaints and docket sheets sealed in accordance with the False Claims
Act.191 Instead, it held that a supposed right of access would be overcome by
the government’s compelling interest in “protecting the integrity of ongoing
fraud investigations” and because the seal provisions are narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling governmental interest.192 In support of its deﬂection of
the constitutional question, the court cited Pearson v. Callahan for the
proposition that “lower federal courts should not ‘pass on questions of
constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.’”193
Similarly, in Webster Groves School District v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., the
Pulitzer Publishing Company intervened to gain access to court records filed
under seal in a lawsuit against a school district following an incident in which
a handicapped child threatened a classmate with a loaded handgun.194 At the
time of the case in 1990, the Eighth Circuit had not yet ruled whether the First
Amendment right of access applied to civil proceedings or court files in civil
lawsuit.195 The court declined to decide these question.196 Instead, it held that
in the particular case, the minor’s privacy interest and the state’s interest in
protecting minors from the dissemination of hurtful information overcame the
publishing company’s supposed right to access the records because the records
included information about the child’s disability and educational records.197 In
these cases, courts did not decide whether a First Amendment right of access
attached, and instead analyzed whether denying access is justified.
Accordingly, careful review of the case law demonstrates eight diﬀerent
ways courts apply the experience prong. They diﬀer most with regards to how
to construe the history of new proceedings, ones that lack a lengthy history
of access, and ones with mixed, ambiguous histories of openness.

189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

673 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 247.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 252.
898 F.2d 1371, 1373 (8th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1374, 1377.
Id.
Id. at 1375, 1377.
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III. REASONS FOR AND AGAINST RELYING ON HISTORY TO
RECOGNIZE A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
Before I analyze these taxonomies, it is important to distill why, according
to the Supreme Court, lower courts, and scholars, history is a basis for a
constitutional right of access, as well as various drawbacks of relying on
history to justify a constitutional right.
A. Why Is History Relevant?
Richmond Newspapers articulated a few reasons why a historical tradition
is relevant to support a constitutional right of access. Justice Brennan’s
concurrence in Richmond Newspapers oﬀered two explanations.198 First, Justice
Brennan wrote that “tradition commands respect in part because the
Constitution carries the gloss of history.”199 Historical context shaped the
drafting of the Constitution and in turn informs its meaning. Second, Justice
Brennan continued that “a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable
judgment of experience.”200 In other words, “tradition deserves deference
because a historical practice reﬂects collective judgment over time that the
particular practice is useful or beneﬁcial.”201
Chief Justice Burger’s plurality opinion did not elaborate in detail why a
historical tradition should support a constitutional right of access, but echoing
Justice Brennan’s ﬁrst argument, he wrote that the “Bill of Rights was enacted
against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively
open.”202 Professor Catherine McCauliﬀ explained that the use of history in
this context “indicated the Court’s respect for long standing customs that
continue to function well” and that “the constitutionalization of the open trial
did not establish an unwarranted departure from custom itself.”203 However,
Press-Enterprise II’s reliance on history from the early nineteenth century
through the twentieth century to justify a right of access to preliminary
hearings forecloses the possibility that a historical tradition of access from the
framing of the Constitution is required. Press-Enterprise II’s historical
construction also negates the arguments that history is a basis for a

Id. at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 589.
Id.
First Amendment—Public Access to Deportation Hearings—Third Circuit Holds That the
Government Can Close “Special Interest” Deportation Hearings, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (2003)
[hereinafter First Amendment—Public Access to Deportation Hearings].
202 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
203 C.M.A. McCauliﬀ, Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law: Complementary
or Rival Modes of Discourse?, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 287, 314 (1987).
198
199
200
201
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constitutional right of access because it represents the original intent of the
Framers and is necessary to provide an originalist constraint on judges.204
In addition, Chief Justice Burger grounded the right of access in the First
Amendment in part because the First Amendment is intended to “prohibit
[the] government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw.”205 Accordingly, it is logical to look to
history and to argue that the government cannot close “court proceedings that
have long been open to the public.”206
In an opinion authored as a D.C. Circuit judge, then-Judge Scalia offered an
additional explanation as to why history is important to recognize a First
Amendment right of access. Judge Scalia wrote that a “historical tradition of at
least some duration is obviously necessary” because “[w]ith neither the constraint
of text nor the constraint of historical practice, nothing would separate the
judicial task of constitutional interpretation from the political task of enacting
laws currently deemed essential.”207 Judge Scalia was wary of courts legislating
from the bench and claimed that recognizing a right based on a history of access
shifts judges’ roles from creating new rights to enforcing existing norms. This
explanation was cited by some subsequent lower court opinions deciding whether
a First Amendment right of access attaches to a particular proceeding.208
The Supreme Court cases do not address challenges posed by relying on
history to recognize a First Amendment right of access, what sorts of
historical traditions are suﬃcient to satisfy the experience prong, or how to
apply the test when evaluating proceedings that do not have as lengthy,
continuous, or old a history of access as criminal proceedings. This absence is
not surprising given the extensive history of access to criminal trials on which
the Supreme Court relied and the limited contexts in which the Supreme
Court has subsequently applied the experience and logic test.
B. Why Not Rely on History?
A circuit case and scholars provide multiple reasons why a historical
tradition should not be required to recognize a constitutional right of access.
Although most lower courts apply the experience and logic test without
justifying their historical construction, the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
204 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th Cir. 2002) (maintaining that PressEnterprise II’s exclusive reliance on “post-Bill of Rights history in determining that preliminary hearings in
criminal cases were historically open” “effectively silenced” the argument that a party must show that a
tradition of access existed at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights to satisfy the experience prong).
205 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576.
206 Ardia, supra note 16, at 863.
207 In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
208 See, e.g., Dhiab v. Trump, 852 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2017); N.Y. Civil Liberties Union
v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 289, 301 n.11 (2d Cir. 2012); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701.
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Chagra argued that historical practice should not be necessary to recognize
a First Amendment right of access because the Supreme Court has
articulated that “the [F]irst [A]mendment must be interpreted in the
context of current values and conditions.”209 According to this perspective,
current values, norms and ethos should inform the meeting of the First
Amendment—not only historical antecedents.
Scholars evaluating the experience and logic test fill in gaps not addressed
by the Supreme Court and lower court opinions. They offer multiple reasons
why history is not a sound basis for recognizing a First Amendment right of
access. First, relying on history does not account for changes in the judicial
system and practices. This is relevant in two respects. In cases where the
reasons for openness in the past have disappeared, then a “tradition of access
may not truly ‘imply the favorable judgment of experience’ . . . .”210 This is
illustrated by two examples. Judge Kimba Wood questioned why the history
of voir dire proceedings from the seventeenth and early eighteenth century
should inform access to jury selection in the twentieth century when the two
proceedings dramatically differ.211 Two hundred years ago, Judge Wood
argued, there was less concern about the effect of pretrial publicity and jurors’
privacy interests, and less need to “ask questions of the type necessary to ferret
out strangers’ biases.”212 But, judges today must ask such “questions—but
many jurors are too embarrassed to answer them candidly in open court.”213
Thus, “[t]he Court’s emphasis on the historical openness of voir dire, divorced
from its context, has led lower courts to favor openness at the expense of
developing information . . . to pick a fair jury.”214 In addition, during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the time period Richmond Newspapers
relied upon to chart the history of open trials, criminal defendants had fewer
procedural protections, like the right to counsel.215 As a result, the open trial
rule then both benefitted the public and defendants.216 But with increased
procedural protections, “the defendant and her attorney [can] play a much
larger role in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system—a function
previously relegated primarily to the public. The historical argument for
openness takes inadequate account of this shift.”217

209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Chagra, 701 F.2d at 363; see also sources cited supra notes 161–164.
Wood, supra note 18, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Second, requiring a historical tradition to recognize a constitutional right
of access precludes new practices or procedures that lack a history of access
from being subject to constitutional protection.218 This is especially relevant
because the judicial system is constantly evolving, public trials in criminal
cases have largely been replaced by charge and plea bargaining, which mainly
take place in private, and judges do much of their work oﬀ of the bench.219 In
other words, “When we make history determinative of future rights of access,
we lock in a static set of practices that may have little to do with the First
Amendment justiﬁcations for public access in the ﬁrst place.”220
Furthermore, relying on history is fraught because “history often appears
equivocal: [p]ractices in the past were not as uniform as one Justice or another
occasionally has claimed.”221 “Events recorded in history may be recorded not
because they are typical, but, in some cases, because they are atypical or
sensational.”222 As a result, basing a right on history raises evidentiary questions:
how long and continuous must a history be to satisfy the experience prong?
“What kind of history counts,” and how unequivocal must the history be?223
In addition, some scholars have argued that relying on history as a condition
for a right of access does not logically mean that the absence of history should
foreclose the right.224 In other words, “a lack of tradition does not prove that a
practice has no utility, or else new traditions would never take root.”225
Some scholars have also questioned the narrowness of courts’ historical
inquiry. An article in the Harvard Law Review reviewing recent circuit cases
argued that “[c]ourts should consider not only the facts of a proceeding’s history
but also the normative implications of that history in deciding whether to find a
public right of access.”226 In particular, the article critiqued PG Publishing Co., in
which the Third Circuit reviewed the history of access to polling sites and voting
but “did not consider the long history of racial discrimination and
disenfranchisement that has accompanied the closed polling process.”227 The
Id.
Id. at 4-5; see also Resnik, supra note 19, at 1670, 1682. Resnik cited a 2014 study that found
a steady decline in total courtroom hours from 2008 to 2013, and that federal judges spent less than
two hours a day on average in the courtroom, or about “‘423 hours of open court proceedings per
active district judge’ annually.”
220 Ardia, supra note 16, at 864.
221 Wood, supra note 18, at 6.
222 Id.
223 Bradley & Siegel, supra note 26, at 21.
224 See Ardia, supra note 16, at 863 (“It does not follow, however, that . . . the absence of
historical access forecloses a First Amendment right of access.”).
225 First Amendment—Public Access to Deportation Hearings, supra note 201, at 1198.
226 First Amendment—Public Access—Third Circuit Holds that First Amendment Does Not Aﬀord
the Public a Protected Right of Access to Polling Places for News-Gathering Purposes, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1067, 1067 (2014).
227 Id.
218
219
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article continued that “[i]t was not until these racially discriminatory laws received
widespread media coverage that Congress was spurred to action, enacting the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.”228 By not evaluating the normative implications of
history, courts “risk denying public access to those proceedings that could most
benefit from the sunlight effects of public discussion and scrutiny.”229
Lastly, some scholars have also critiqued the use of history in this line of
cases because of the inconsistent ways in which lower courts apply the
experience prong. While this objection could be remedied, it is important to
recognize the problems posed by inconsistency in judicial decisionmaking.
“[C]onsistency in decision-making enhances the actuality and appearance of
fairness[,] . . . ensures that similar cases are and appear to be treated similarly”
and increases predictability.230 “Inconsistent decisions give rise to suspicions
that the courts’ analyses are outcome-driven.”231
Thus, while lower courts are largely silent about the problems posed by
relying on history to recognize a First Amendment right of access, scholars
critique the centrality of history in this doctrine for four primary reasons: the
ways in which the historical inquiry does not account for changes in
government, the evidentiary issues it poses, the narrowness of the history
inquiry, and the inconsistent application of the experience prong.
IV. ANALYZING WHETHER THE TAXONOMIES ARE IN LINE
WITH OR DEPART FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S
CONSTRUCTION AND REASONING
After charting lower courts’ different applications of the experience prong
and surveying reasons for and against the use of history in recognizing a right of
access under the First Amendment, it is now possible to analyze how the different
approaches are in line with or depart from the Supreme Court’s reasoning.
1. Faithful to the Supreme Court’s Experience Prong
At ﬁrst glance, lower courts’ faithfulness to the experience prong
undermines scholars’ critiques of the doctrine as many lower courts appear
not to suggest that the current experience prong is unworkable. But the fact
that many of the cases in which courts found no history of access involved
new laws, proceedings or documents, including laws passed in 1964 and 1986,
and procedures promulgated in 1991, underscores critiques that the test’s
reliance on history is not well suited to address changes and innovations in
228
229
230
231

Id. at 1073.
Id. at 1074.
Levine, supra note 16, at 1792.
Id.
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judicial and governmental practices. This is especially troublesome given that
the justiﬁcations for a right of access to criminal trials articulated in Richmond
Newspapers—including increasing conﬁdence in the administration of justice
and informing the public about the works of government—are applicable to
areas of government outside of the judicial system and because of the
importance of the First Amendment to “assur[e] freedom of communication
on matters relating to the functioning of government.”232 Additionally,
highlighting that lower courts chart a history of access most similar to those
in the Supreme Court cases in situations involving access to diﬀerent parts
of the judicial system strengthens the question whether the experience prong
is applicable to scenarios outside of the judicial context.
2. Framing-Era History
Press-Enterprise II’s historical survey of access to preliminary hearings
from the early nineteenth century through the twentieth century eﬀectively
silenced the argument that Framing-era history is required and that a
historical tradition is a basis for a right of access because it demonstrates the
intent of the Framers.233 Accordingly, it is not surprising that none of the
circuit case law surveyed required Framing-era history to satisfy the
experience prong. But this approach is still important when analyzing the
experience prong because in the cases surveyed, some defendants argued that
under Richmond Newspapers, Framing-era history is required—an argument
that the federal case law has emphatically rejected.234
3. State Statutes
Relying on the passage of state statutes to satisfy the experience prong is
in line with the two main reasons for why history is relevant. The fact that
state legislatures deliberated and passed laws guaranteeing access in the
particular contexts, and that the laws continue to be in eﬀect “reﬂects
collective judgment over time that the particular practice is useful or

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The Supreme
Court effectively silenced this argument in Press-Enterprises II, where the Court relied on
exclusively post-Bill of Rights history in determining that preliminary hearings in criminal
cases were historically open.”).
234 See, e.g., id.; see also N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286,
298-99 (2d Cir. 2011). (“The Supreme Court has not specified how courts should determine
whether the experience and logic test applies to administrative proceedings. But we have good
reason to think that this determination does not involve asking whether the proceedings in
question have a history of openness dating back to the Founding.”).
232
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beneﬁcial.”235 In addition, relying on state statutes does not require judges to
make policy decisions or decide whether to create a new practice.
However, the historical constructions in the cases that rely on state statutes
to satisfy the experience prong are narrower than the historical constructions
in the Supreme Court cases. The laws guaranteeing access to township
planning commission meetings, at issue in Whiteland Woods, were only passed
in 1968 and 1986, and some of the state laws granting access to voter lists, cited
in Cal-Almond, were only passed in 1969 and 1970. This analysis thus
demonstrates that narrower historical traditions than those in the Supreme
Court cases can be in line with the reasoning of, and justifications provided
by, the Supreme Court cases on the First Amendment right of access.
In addition, emphasizing the recent passage of these laws is critical
because it underscores the diﬀerent ways courts construe modern laws and
recent practices when applying the experience prong. While laws passed in
the last half of the twentieth century were suﬃcient in Whiteland Woods and
Cal-Almond to satisfy the experience prong, other courts, as previously
discussed, maintained that the passage of laws in 1964, at issue in El-Sayegh,
and in 1986, at issue in In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
2703(d), for example, were too recent to have developed any history or
tradition of public access. The laws in Whiteland Woods and Cal-Almond can
be distinguished from the Criminal Justice Act, at issue in El-Sayegh, and the
Stored Communications Act, at issue in In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 2703(d), because the laws in the former cases explicitly grant
public access, while the latter laws do not. But the comparison nonetheless
highlights the diﬀerent ways courts construe recent laws and developments
when applying the experience prong.
4. Recent History and Practices
Like the usage of state statutes, relying on recent history and practices to
satisfy the experience prong is in line with the justiﬁcations for why history
is relevant to recognize a right of access. The fact that courts have found prior
patterns of access suggests that there has been some judgment or consensus
that access in the particular context is positive and. In addition, ﬁnding
precedent in historical practice—even recent or narrow ones—limits a judge’s
need to create policy or new practices.
However, although the lower court opinions adopting this approach do not
acknowledge it, relying on recent history and practices to satisfy the
experience prong affirms many of the problems articulated by scholars with
basing a right of access on a historical tradition. For example, the timespan of
235

First Amendment—Public Access to Deportation Hearings, supra note 201, at 1198.
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the historical inquiry affects a court’s conclusion. In Erie County, for example,
the Second Circuit relied on the fact that monitor reports in four recent cases
were accessible to the public to find a tradition of access,236 but if the timespan
was broader and included additional cases, then the court may have reached a
different conclusion. Similarly, in Applications of National Broadcasting Co., the
court held that the experience prong was satisfied because reviewing Sixth
Circuit cases over a sixty-year period, it found no case involving the
disqualification of judges in which the proceedings were closed or the records
were sealed.237 But had the court broadened its inquiry to include other courts
or to cover a longer duration, it may have arrived at a different result. The
Supreme Court cases give no direction as to how lengthy, continuous or strong
a historical tradition of access must be. Thus, although relying on recent
history and practices to satisfy the experience prong is in line with the reasons
why history is relevant to recognize a constitutional right of access, the use of
history in this context raises other interpretative questions.
5. Mixed History
As outlined previously, courts construe mixed history in two diﬀerent
ways, and I must analyze each approach. The construction of history by the
Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press and by the Ninth Circuit in California First
Amendment Coalition resemble the Supreme Court’s construction of history
in Press-Enterprise II. Like Press-Enterprise II, these circuit court opinions
acknowledge that some historical evidence demonstrates a history of access
to deportation hearings and executions, while other evidence suggests that
the proceedings are not open to the public. This approach reinforces Justice
Brennan’s “favorable judgment of experience” argument because the courts
ﬁnd, overtime, an overall pattern of access. Like in the taxonomies involving
state statutes and recent history and practices, this suggests that a
longstanding, unanimous history of access, as was demonstrated in Richmond
Newspapers, is not needed to demonstrate “collective judgment over time that
the particular practice is useful or beneﬁcial.”238
However, comparing the construction of history in the execution cases to
Press-Enterprise II raises another question. In Press-Enterprise II, the constructions
of history suggested that access to preliminary hearings was “more open” than
“closed,” that assessing the historical evidence as a whole indicated that there
236 United States v. Erie County, N.Y., 763 F.3d 235, 241-42 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Second, NYCLU
points to several instances where reports like the ones at hand have been accessible to the public.”).
237 Applications of Nat’l Broad. Co., 828 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1987) (“We have surveyed
reported Sixth Circuit cases involving the disqualiﬁcation of judges from 1924 to 1984 and have not
found one in which the proceedings were closed or the record sealed.”).
238 First Amendment—Public Access to Deportation Hearings, supra note 201, at 1198.
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was greater evidence of public access than restricted access to the particular
proceeding. But is the same true for executions? Must the analysis be so granular,
and what point does a mixed history tilt more towards being closed than being
opened? The Supreme Court cases do not help answer these questions.
Some of the opinions that maintain that mixed history is not sufficient to
satisfy the experience prong, including the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media
Group and Arkansas and Oklahoma district courts in cases involving access to
executions, argue that the respective histories of access do not satisfy the
experience prong because they are not “unbroken” and “uncontradicted.”239 By
focusing on the language of Richmond Newspapers and its historical
construction in particular, these opinions suggest that the Supreme Court
requires an “unbroken, uncontradicted” history of access to satisfy the
experience prong. While it is important to differentiate between the respective
histories of access to criminal trials and deportation hearings and executions,
courts’ appeals to the “unbroken” and “uncontradicted” language in Richmond
Newspapers suggest insufficient recognition of the differences between the
historical constructions in Press-Enterprise II and in the prior three Supreme
Court cases. Press-Enterprise II presents a more nuanced historical survey than
the other Supreme Court cases, as the majority opinion acknowledges that the
history of access to preliminary hearings is not monolithic, but is characterized
by a general presumption of openness, in spite of examples in which such
proceedings have been closed. The cases that argue that mixed history is not
sufficient latch onto the language of Richmond Newspapers, but do not give
sufficient credence to the subsequent Supreme Court cases that demonstrate
that uniformity in practice is not required to satisfy the experience prong.
Because the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II did not explicitly articulate
that it was departing from the prior Supreme Court cases’ historical
constructions, and because the Court in Globe Newspaper did not acknowledge
that there was evidence that trials involving minor victims of sexual assault
were closed, this absence allowed some lower court opinions to largely focus
on the historical construction in Richmond Newspaper and to underappreciate
the application of the experience prong in Press-Enterprise II.
Additionally, PG Publishing Co. raises important unaddressed questions
about in what contexts a proceeding can lose its First Amendment right of
access, given that voting was initially conducted in public but overtime
became a private activity. While PG Publishing Co. was the only case I
reviewed that dealt with the history of a proceeding that lost its public
elements when it became private, this question may become more salient as
239 N. Jersey Media Grp. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2002); Okla. Observer v.
Patton, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1325-26 (W.D. Okla. 2014); Ark. Times, Inc. v. Norris, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3500, *12 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2008).
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court-like and other governmental proceedings increasingly move out of the
public sphere and assume more private dimensions.240
6. Rejecting Historical Analysis Altogether
Courts’ rejection of the experience prong departs from the two main
reasons oﬀered why history is relevant to recognize a First Amendment right
of access and repudiates a deﬁning feature of the First Amendment right of
access doctrine. This approach challenges Judge Scalia’s view that relying on
a historical tradition precludes judges from legislating from the bench. Justice
Brennan’s “favorable judgment of experience” justiﬁcation is not instructive
when there is no history. Justice Brennan wrote that a “case for a right of
access has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of
public entree to a particular proceedings or information,”241 but this
perspective gives little direction as to whether a right of access should be
recognized when such a history is lacking.
This approach is problematic, however, not only because of its divergence
from Supreme Court precedents on the First Amendment right of access, but
because of the diverging case law it generates as courts differ about how to apply
the experience prong to proceedings that lack a history of access. This is
reflected by comparing the Second Circuit’s rejection of the experience prong
in Suarez because the Criminal Justice Act was only passed in 1964, to the Tenth
Circuit’s denial of a right of access to documents filed under the Criminal Justice
Act in Gonzales because it found that there is no history of access given the
relative recent passage of the statute.242 Not only does this approach reject tenets
of the right of access doctrine, but its continued application generates divergent
case law because lower courts have not uniformly rejected the experience prong.
7. Analogous Historical Inquiry
Surveying the ways in which courts compare new proceedings to older
ones with histories of access demonstrates the diﬃculty some courts face
applying the experience prong to new proceedings and the creativity required

See Resnik, supra note 19, at 1670, 1682.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980).
Compare United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626, 631 (2d Cir. 1989) (“It is true that there is
no long ‘tradition of accessibility’ to CJA forms. However, that is because the CJA itself is, in terms
of ‘tradition,’ a fairly recent development, having been enacted in 1964 . . . .”) with United States v.
Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Obviously, the CJA is too recent in origin to have
developed any ‘history’ or ‘tradition’ with respect to press access to documents required by that
Act.”). See supra sources accompanying notes 91–93, 153–156.
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to ﬁt “new institutions” into “existing legal structures.”243 This approach is
not in line with Justice Brennan’s conception that appeals to history and an
assessment of the “speciﬁc structural value of public access” can limit the
potentially limitless application of the First Amendment right of access.
8. Not Deciding the First Amendment Question Because Closure Was Justified
Not deciding whether the First Amendment recognizes a right of access
to a particular proceeding is supported by principles of constitutional
jurisprudence. However, it deﬂects hard questions posed by the doctrine’s use
of history. This perspective is demonstrated by American Civil Liberties Union
v. Holder, in which the Fourth Circuit did not decide whether there is a First
Amendment right of access to sealed qui tam complaints.244 The newness of
the sealing of qui tam complaints may have been at issue because the
requirement was only added to the False Claims Act in 1986.245 While the
court did not explicitly make this point, the argument can be supported by
the fact that the Fourth Circuit in In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 2703(d) found that there was no long tradition of access to orders
required by a law that was also passed in 1986.246
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recognition of a right of access under the First
Amendment in Richmond Newspapers in 1980 and its formalization of the
experience and logic test to determine if the right attaches in Press-Enterprise
II in 1986 spawned lower court case law applying the test beyond the initial
context in which it was developed and applied by the Supreme Court. Careful
review of the case law reveals eight diﬀerent ways lower courts have used
history to analyze the experience prong. This analysis highlights that the
divergent approaches reﬂect diﬀerent viewpoints as to how to evaluate
history when dealing with proceedings or documents that lack a history of
access because they are new or because the particular historical traditions
involve mixed practices of openness. Because the Supreme Court has not
addressed the interpretative questions raised by relying on historical
traditions in such contexts, this absence has allowed circuit and district courts
to create diﬀerent approaches. It has generated divergent, inconsistent case
N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 299 (2d Cir. 2012).
673 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 247.
In re U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 291 (4th Cir.
2013) (“Subscribers concede that there is no long tradition of access speciﬁcally for § 2703(d) orders,
given that the SCA was enacted in 1986.”).
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law on the First Amendment right of access. This result is problematic not
only because it creates little consistency and oﬀers little direction to litigants.
It is also troubling because it undermines the impact and development of the
First Amendment right of access doctrine, which was recognized in order to
increase public conﬁdence in the administration of justice, create an informed
public, and strengthen and secure our system of government. While the
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the doctrine, the little
direction oﬀered as to how to evaluate history when applying the experience
prong of the experience and logic test ultimately has challenged the doctrine’s
application to proceedings that are relatively new, lack a history of access, and
are beset by histories of open and closed practices.
Justice Blackmun heralded the Court’s reliance on history to fashion the First
Amendment right of access doctrine, and Justice Brennan relied on historical
traditions because history informs the meaning of constitutional rights and can
reflect the “favorable judgment of experience.” But, this review of circuit court
opinions from the 31 years since the experience and logic test was first articulated
demonstrates that using history as a tool for recognizing constitutional rights in
this context has not lived up to its architects’ lofty conceptions. Instead, it has
generated interpretive challenges and inconsistent case law as judges apply the
experience and logic test beyond the narrow context in which it was born.
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